This study examines the persistent obstacles to the economization of the Islamic Republic of Iran's foreign policy through an integrated conceptual framework derived from New Institutionalism and Foreign Policy Analysis. Employing a qualitative approach based on a systematic literature review and in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 18 policy and economic elites, this research argues that the primary impediments are not merely external pressures but are deeply rooted in institutional rigidity and historical path dependency within Iran's decision-making structures. Findings indicate that this institutional context fosters an environment where the dominance of a security-driven institutional logic over an economic logic, coupled with bureaucratic rivalries among parallel institutions, systematically hinders the transformation of diplomacy into a tool for trade development and investment attraction. While sanctions have acted as an external catalyst highlighting the need for trade partner diversification, the study suggests that without profound institutional reforms in domestic rules of the game and the bureaucratic incentive system, these opportunities will not be fully realized. By analyzing the interplay between structures (institutions) and agents (bureaucracies), this research proposes that an effective operationalization strategy must focus on the de-institutionalization of dysfunctional procedures and the institutionalization of coordinative, economically-oriented structures.